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concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). A consent that is "induced by 
misrepresentation is not consent." 301 
Md. at 350,483 A.2dat35 (Eldridge,J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). The misrepresentation in Thomas 
was that the defendant's counsel 
believed that the psychiatrist that 
evaluated the defendant was a neutral 
expert from Clifton T. Perkins and not 
the prosecution's paid expert. 
The dissenter then dissected the 
.majority's reasoning. He stated that the 
burden of proof differences between 
. Thomas and Estelle, as well as the 
psychiatrist's warnings to the defendant 
that any information which he revealed 
could be used at a subsequent capital 
sentencing hearing, were "utterly 
irrelevant to the Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel issue." 301 Md. at 352, 483 
A.2d at 36 (Eldridge, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
Furthermore, Judge Eldridge argued that 
although the defendant's counsel 
consented to the psychiatrist's 
examination, as in Estelle, his consent 
was based on a misrepresentation by the 
prosecution concerning the neutrality of 
the psychiatrist. Therefore, citing Estelle 
as controlling, the dissenter concluded 
that "[b ]ecause of the prosecution's 
misleading action in this case, the 
defendant Thomas was deprived of the 
assistance of counsel in deciding 
whether or not to submit to ... [the 
psychiatrist's] examination in 
connection with the capital sentencing 
hearing." 3D1 Md. at 352,483 A.2d at 
36 (Eldridge, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
The Thomas court appears to have 
restricted the defendant's right to 
assistance of counsel under the sixth 
amendment. By allowing the post-trial 
psychiatric examination of the 
defendant for a determination on the 
imposition of the death penalty without 
the knowledgeable consent of the 
defendant's counsel, it has gutted the 
sixth amendment's protections 
promulgated in Estelle. The court is 
opening the door for the prosecution's 
use of trickery and misrepresentation in 
order to gain a defendant's counsel's 
consent and to deny a defendant the 
assistance of counsel guaranteed him 
under the sixth amendment. Without 
such assistance of counsel, poorly 
educated and fearful defendants will be 
wittingly or unwittingly denied the full 
protection of the law by the 
prosecution. m 
- by Sam Piazza 
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DOCKWORKER'S REMEDY 
T
he issue of whether a 
dockworker's exclusive remedy 
for an occupational injury is 
under the Longshoremen's and Harbor 
Workers' Compensation Act ("Act" or 
"LHWCA"), 33 U.S.c. §901 et seq., 
where a portion of the injury preceded 
the Act's coverage, was subject to review 
by the Maryland Court of Appeals 
during its September, 1984 term. A 
decision in Stanley v. Western Maryland 
Railway Company, 301 Md. 204 482 
A.2d881 (1984), was reached on October 
24, 1984 and is one which will have 
substantial impact in the area of 
workers' compensation benefits. In 
order to understand the ramifications of 
Stanley, however, one must first have a 
basic understanding of the principles 
underlying the system of workers' 
compensation. 
Benefits for employees injured while 
on the job were first a product of state 
common law and statutes. Although the 
fifty states vary greatly as to the 
substantive legal principles which guide 
particular workers' compensation 
schemes, all systems share the same 
underlying principles: to compensate an 
employee as quickly and efficiently as 
possible for work-related injuries, 
regardless of an employee's 
contributory negligence, and to limit the 
ultimate liability of the employer for any 
such injuries. 
Prior to 1927, there was not a 
uniform scheme of compensation law 
applied by the states to Injuries 
sustained by maritime workers. 
Congress, therefore, saw the need for a 
uniform federal system and the 
LHWCA "was designed to ensure that a 
compensation remedy existed for all 
injuries sustained by employees on 
navigable waters and to avoid 
uncertainty as to the source, state or 
federal, of that remedy." Calbeck v. 
Travelers Insurance Co., 370 U.S. 114, 
124 (1962). 
Apparently, this federal system of 
workers' compensation benefits for 
,maritime employees provided sufficient 
benefits to injured workers for a number 
of years. However, a problem arose in 
that a maritime employee was only 
covered under the Act for certain 
activities (usually only those performed 
on navigable waters) and would not, in a 
maj ori ty of cases, receive any 
compensation benefits under LHWCA 
for injuries sustained on land. Congress 
amended the Act in 1972 "to extend 
coverage to additional workers in an 
attempt to avoid anomalies inherent in a 
system that drew lines at the water's edge 
by allowing compensation under the Act 
only to workers injured on the seaward 
side of a pier." Northeast Marine 
Terminal Co., Inc. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 
249 (1977). 
In the instant case, James Stanley had 
been an employee of the Western 
Maryland Railway Company since 
1942. In approximately 1955 or 1956 
Stanley was assigned to operate a crane 
used to unload cargo from ships. The 
crane was extremely noisy and caused a 
gradual auditory impairment in 
Stanley'S ears. He first became aware of 
his permanent hearing loss in 1977 and, 
in 1979, filed a negligence action against 
his employer under the Federal 
Employers' Liability Act ("FELA"), 45 
U.S.c. §51 et seq. 
The Federal Employers' Liability Act, 
enacted by Congress in 1908, permitted 
a claimant to sue the railroad company, 
his employer, for injuries resulting from 
the company's negligence. Stanley 
contended that the majority of his long 
term exposure occurred prior to 1972, 
at a time when he, as a dockworker, was 
not covered by the LHWCA. Stanley, 
therefore, sought to apportion his 
hearing loss claim between the two 
distinct Acts, FELA and LHWCA. In 
apportioning his disability between the 
two Acts, however, Stanley made a 
valiant attempt to sue his employer twice 
for the same occupational injury, thus, 
defeating the principle behind the 
system of workers' compensation of 
limiting an emplo]ers' liability. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the 
decision of both the Court of Special 
Appeals and the trial court and 
adamantly refused to apportion the 
claimant's injury between the two Acts. 
In fact, in the area of workers' 
compensation, the courts are generally 
quite reluctant to apportion in such a 
manner. See Newport News Shipbuilding 
& Drydock Co. v. Fishel, 694 F.2d 327 
(4th Cir. 1982) (single employer liable 
for the claimant's hearing loss although 
it was fully documented that the 
claimant worked for numerous 
employers). Apportionment between 
state and federal systems is also not 
permitted. See McCabe v. Sun 
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock, Inc., 
Ben.Rev.Bd.Serv. (MB) 509 (1975), 
rev'd. on other grounds, 593 F.2d 234 (3d 
Cir. 1979). In Stanley, the court 
determined that since the LHWCA 
applied to a portion of the claimant's 
injury, then the Act would provide 
coverage for the entire injury. 
The only case cited by Stanley as 
providing authority for his position is 
Verderane v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 
14 Ben.Rev.Bd.serv. (MB) 220.15, 
BRB No. 76-244 (Aug. 13, 1981). At 
issue in that case was whether the 
claimant was a covered employee under 
the Act during his long history of 
employment, and the Benefits Review 
Board ("Board") stated, "[W]e have 
concluded that in determining 
jurisdiction we must apply pre-
amendment law to the period of 
exposure prior to 1972 when the Act 
became effective, and post-amendment 
law thereafter;" 14 Ben.Rev.Bd. Servo 
(MB) at 223. This statement, however, 
was limited to the issue of determining 
jurisdiction and was not applied by the 
Board to determine the issue of 
apportionment. Under this line of 
reasoning, the Board found that 
Verderane was covered under the pre-
amendment Act, although not covered 
after 1972. This fact, however, did not 
deter the Board from holding that the 
entire claim was compensable under the 
LHWCA. "However, our conclusion 
that claimant may have been exposed to 
additional excessive noise during the 
period when his employment was 
outside the coverage of the Act does not 
affect our determination that his vertigo 
is compensable based on the earlier 
exposure." Id. at 225. 
The Stanley decision is in accord with 
the public policy considerations which 
are an essential part of the workers' 
compensation system. To allow this 
type of apportionment would clearly 
defeat the Congressional intent of 
limiting an employer's liability for a 
maritime worker's occupational injury. 
Such apportionment between acts 
would be in obvious conflict with the 
LHWCA, 33 U.S.c. §905 (a) which 
provides that "[ t ]he liability of an 
employer prescribed in section 904 of 
this title shall be exclusive and in place of 
all other liablility of such employer to 
the employee... ." Stanley, therefore, 
manifests the intent of Congress 
regarding the exclusiveness of liability 
under the LHWCA and, presumably, 
any possible apportionment between 
Acts is an issue for the Congress and not 
the courts to ultimately determine. m 
- by Cathleen A. Quigg 
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IMPERFECT SELF DEFENSE 
I
nState V. Faulkner, 301 Md. 
482,483 A.2d 759 (1984), the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland 
recognized that imperfect self defense 
can be used by a defendant as a defense 
to mitigate a conviction entered against 
him. To prevail upon such a defense, the 
defendant must show the jury that his 
actions were based on a subjectively 
honest but objectively unreasonable 
belief that he had to resort to deadly 
force to prevent his own serious bodily 
injury or death. 
Faulkner had been involved in an 
argument outside of a Baltimore City 
bar. This argument escalated into a fist 
fight and then into a non-fatal shooting. 
Subsequently, Faulkner was charged 
with assault with intent to murder and 
related offenses. At his trial in the 
Criminal Court of Baltimore, the court 
instructed the jury as to the defenses of 
justification. Faulkner's request for a 
jury instruction on imperfect self 
defense was refused by the judge. The 
jury subsequently found Faulkner guilty 
of assault with intent to murder. On 
appeal, the court of special appeals, in a 
split decision, agreed with Faulkner, and 
held that he was entitled to the 
instruction of imperfect self defense 
because he had produced enough 
evidence to generate a jury issue 
regarding his belief at the time of the 
shooting. The court of appeals agreed, 
and went on to hold that the defense of 
imperfect self defense applies to the 
offense of assault with intent to murder. 
The mitigating defense of imperfect 
self defense operates to negate malice, 
which is the mental state that the state 
must prove to establish the crime of 
murder. The court began its opinion by 
noting that the difference between 
murder and manslaughter is the absence 
of malice. Self defense operates as a 
complete defense to either murder or 
manslaughter. A proper claim of self 
defense will justify the homicide and 
result in a judgment of acquittal. On the 
other hand, imperfect self defense is not 
a complete defense to a crime, but 
rather, is merely a mitigating defense 
which operates to negate malice, thereby 
reducing murder to manslaughter. 
Similar to imperfect self defense are 
the heat of passion defenses of mutual 
combat, assault and battery and 
discovering a spouse in the act of sexual 
intercourse with another, which can also 
be used by a defendant to mitigate a 
conviction entered against him. The key 
Spring, 1985 /The Law Fmum-9 
